14 research outputs found
LeakyOhm: Secret Bits Extraction using Impedance Analysis
The threats of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures have
been widely researched. Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the
unavoidable influence of computation or storage on current consumption or
voltage drop on a chip. Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for
instance, power or electromagnetic analysis. In this work, we introduce a novel
non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent
changes in the impedance of the chip. Our attack relies on the fact that the
temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of
the circuit, which results in changes in the die's impedance. To sense such
impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called
scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high
frequencies into the system's power distribution network (PDN) and measure the
echo of the signals. We demonstrate that according to the content bits and
physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently
at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing
of individual registers. Such side-channel leakage challenges the -probing
security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel
countermeasure. To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled
impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and
high-order masked AES. We show that in the case of the profiled attack, only a
single trace is required to recover the secret key. Finally, we discuss how a
specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance
leakage
LeakyOhm: Secret Bits Extraction using Impedance Analysis
The threat of physical side-channel attacks and their countermeasures is a widely researched field.
Most physical side-channel attacks rely on the unavoidable influence of computation or storage on voltage or current fluctuations.
Such data-dependent influence can be exploited by, for instance, power or electromagnetic analysis.
In this work, we introduce a novel non-invasive physical side-channel attack, which exploits the data-dependent changes in the impedance of the chip.
Our attack relies on the fact that the temporarily stored contents in registers alter the physical characteristics of the circuit, which results in changes in the die\u27s impedance.
To sense such impedance variations, we deploy a well-known RF/microwave method called scattering parameter analysis, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies into the system\u27s power distribution network (PDN) and measure the echo of the signals.
We demonstrate that according to the content bits and physical location of a register, the reflected signal is modulated differently at various frequency points enabling the simultaneous and independent probing of individual registers.
Such side-channel leakage violates the -probing security model assumption used in masking, which is a prominent side-channel countermeasure.
To validate our claims, we mount non-profiled and profiled impedance analysis attacks on hardware implementations of unprotected and high-order masked AES.
We show that in the case of profiled attack, only a single trace is required to recover the secret key.
Finally, we discuss how a specific class of hiding countermeasures might be effective against impedance leakage
Silicon Echoes: Non-Invasive Trojan and Tamper Detection using Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis
The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-of-concept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P&R, can be detected
HyperDbg: Reinventing Hardware-Assisted Debugging (Extended Version)
Software analysis, debugging, and reverse engineering have a crucial impact
in today's software industry. Efficient and stealthy debuggers are especially
relevant for malware analysis. However, existing debugging platforms fail to
address a transparent, effective, and high-performance low-level debugger due
to their detectable fingerprints, complexity, and implementation restrictions.
In this paper, we present HyperDbg, a new hypervisor-assisted debugger for
high-performance and stealthy debugging of user and kernel applications. To
accomplish this, HyperDbg relies on state-of-the-art hardware features
available in today's CPUs, such as VT-x and extended page tables. In contrast
to other widely used existing debuggers, we design HyperDbg using a custom
hypervisor, making it independent of OS functionality or API. We propose
hardware-based instruction-level emulation and OS-level API hooking via
extended page tables to increase the stealthiness. Our results of the dynamic
analysis of 10,853 malware samples show that HyperDbg's stealthiness allows
debugging on average 22% and 26% more samples than WinDbg and x64dbg,
respectively. Moreover, in contrast to existing debuggers, HyperDbg is not
detected by any of the 13 tested packers and protectors. We improve the
performance over other debuggers by deploying a VMX-compatible script engine,
eliminating unnecessary context switches. Our experiment on three concrete
debugging scenarios shows that compared to WinDbg as the only kernel debugger,
HyperDbg performs step-in, conditional breaks, and syscall recording, 2.98x,
1319x, and 2018x faster, respectively. We finally show real-world applications,
such as a 0-day analysis, structure reconstruction for reverse engineering,
software performance analysis, and code-coverage analysis
HyperDbg: Reinventing Hardware-Assisted Debugging
Software analysis, debugging, and reverse engineering have a crucial impact in today's software industry. Efficient and stealthy debuggers are especially relevant for malware analysis. However, existing debugging platforms fail to address a transparent, effective, and high-performance low-level debugger due to their detectable fingerprints, complexity, and implementation restrictions.
In this paper, we present StealthDbg, a new hypervisor-assisted debugger for high-performance and stealthy debugging of user and kernel applications. To accomplish this, StealthDbg relies on state-of-the-art hardware features available in today's CPUs, such as VT-x and extended page tables. In contrast to other widely used existing debuggers, we design StealthDbg using a custom hypervisor, making it independent of OS functionality or API. We propose hardware-based instruction-level emulation and OS-level API hooking via extended page tables to increase the stealthiness. Our results of the dynamic analysis of 10,853 malware samples show that StealthDbg's stealthiness allows debugging on average 22% and 26% more samples than WinDbg and x64dbg, respectively. Moreover, in contrast to existing debuggers, StealthDbg is not detected by any of the 13 tested packers and protectors. We improve the performance over other debuggers by deploying a VMX-compatible script engine, eliminating unnecessary context switches. Our experiment on three concrete debugging scenarios shows that compared to WinDbg as the only kernel debugger, StealthDbg performs step-in, conditional breaks, and syscall recording, 2.98x, 1319x, and 2018x faster, respectively. We finally show real-world applications, such as a 0-day analysis, structure reconstruction for reverse engineering, software performance analysis, and code-coverage analysis
Silicon Echoes: Non-Invasive Trojan and Tamper Detection using Frequency-Selective Impedance Analysis
The threat of chip-level tampering and its detection has been widely researched. Hardware Trojan insertions are prominent examples of such tamper events. Altering the placement and routing of a design or removing a part of a circuit for side-channel leakage/fault sensitivity amplification are other instances of such attacks. While semi- and fully-invasive physical verification methods can confidently detect such stealthy tamper events, they are costly, time-consuming, and destructive. On the other hand, virtually all proposed non-invasive side-channel methods suffer from noise and, therefore, have low confidence. Moreover, they require activating the tampered part of the circuit (e.g., the Trojan trigger) to compare and detect the modifications. In this work, we introduce a non-invasive post-silicon tamper detection technique applicable to different classes of tamper events at the chip level without requiring the activation of the malicious circuit. Our method relies on the fact that physical modifications (regardless of their physical, activation, or action characteristics) alter the impedance of the chip. Hence, characterizing the impedance can lead to the detection of the tamper events. To sense the changes in the impedance, we deploy known RF tools, namely, scattering parameters, in which we inject sine wave signals with high frequencies to the power distribution network (PDN) of the system and measure the “echo” of the signal. The reflected signals in various frequency bands reveal different tamper events based on their impact size on the die. To validate our claims, we performed measurements on several proof-ofconcept tampered hardware implementations realized on FPGAs manufactured with a 28 nm technology. We further show that deploying the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance can distinguish between tamper events and noise resulting from manufacturing process variation of different chips/boards. Based on the acquired results, we demonstrate that stealthy hardware Trojans, as well as sophisticated modifications of P&R, can be detected